Deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan
At a Glance
Section titled “At a Glance”| Metadata | Details |
|---|---|
| Publication Date | 2023-03-04 |
| Journal | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |
| Authors | Larry Diamond, James O. Ellis |
| Citations | 5 |
Abstract
Section titled “Abstract”ABSTRACTThere is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms “reunification.” Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a “porcupine strategy” of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security.KEYWORDS: TaiwanChinaJapanTaiwan straitCross-strait relationsporcupine strategy AcknowledgmentsThe authors co-led a delegation on regional security and semiconductor technology to Taiwan in August 2022 that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. In addition, this paper draws on insights generated by conferences and presentations organized by the Hoover Institution’s Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, which receives annual support from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco—the representative office of Taiwan in the area—as well as from private donors. We thank them and the Hoover Institution for their support. We also thank Michael Brown for his comments on a draft of this article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).FundingThe authors co-led an August 2022 delegation to Taiwan to discuss security and semiconductor technology that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. This paper draws on meetings and conferences that benefited in part from this financial support. However, no official of the government of Taiwan or the US government reviewed any portion of this paper prior to publication, and no permission or feedback was sought from any government official or agency. The paper represents the authors’ own independent thinking and not the views of any government, government agency, or other organization.FundingThe authors co-led an August 2022 delegation to Taiwan to discuss security and semiconductor technology that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. This paper draws on meetings and conferences that benefited in part from this financial support. However, no official of the government of Taiwan or the US government reviewed any portion of this paper prior to publication, and no permission or feedback was sought from any government official or agency. The paper represents the authors’ own independent thinking and not the views of any government, government agency, or other organization.Additional informationFundingThe authors co-led an August 2022 delegation to Taiwan to discuss security and semiconductor technology that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. This paper draws on meetings and conferences that benefited in part from this financial support. However, no official of the government of Taiwan or the US government reviewed any portion of this paper prior to publication, and no permission or feedback was sought from any government official or agency. The paper represents the authors’ own independent thinking and not the views of any government, government agency, or other organization.Notes on contributorsLarry DiamondLarry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He co-chairs the Hoover Institution’s Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its Project on China’s Global Sharp Power. He has visited Taiwan annually since 1995 and was a visiting fellow at the Academia Sinica in Taipei during 1997-98.James O. EllisJames O. Ellis, Jr., USN (Ret.) is the Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He co-chairs the Hoover Institution’s Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and chairs Hoover’s Global Policy and Strategy Initiative. A 39-year Navy veteran, he held six operational commands and several senior staff positions. In 1996, Adm. Ellis served as commander of the aircraft carrier battle group that led US contingency response operations in the Taiwan Strait.
Tech Support
Section titled “Tech Support”Original Source
Section titled “Original Source”References
Section titled “References”- 2022 - Revised version of paper presented to the Hoover Institution conference on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region
- 2021 - A Large Number of Small Things: A Porcupine Strategy for Taiwan